In this paper, a code-based public-key cryptosystem based on interleaved Goppa codes is presented. The scheme is based on encrypting several ciphertexts with the same Goppa code and adding a burst error to them. Possible attacks are outlined and the key size of several choices of parameters is compared to those of known schemes for the same security level. For example, for security level 128 bits, we obtain a key size of 696 Kbits whereas the classical McEliece scheme based on Goppa codes using list decoding requires a key size of 1935 Kbits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of a cryptographic scheme is achieved due to the intractability of certain problems through modern computers. Currently, several companies are trying to build a quantum computer with computational capabilities and power beyond classical computing limits. In 1994, Shor introduced an algorithm [25] that enables factorization of large integers and finding discrete logarithms on capable quantum computers efficiently. Shor's algorithm would therefore break currently used public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA [21] and also systems based on elliptic curve cryptography. As a result, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently initiated a standardization process of post-quantum secure cryptosystems, including code-based cryptosystems.
The McEliece code-based cryptosystem [13] is based on the hardness of decoding a random code. In this scheme, Alice chooses a linear code, masks its generator matrix by multiplying it with two special random matrices and keeps all three as a private key. Her public key is the product of these matrices, which can be used for encryption. However, decryption can only be done if the decomposition of the public key into the three matrices is known. The original system based on Goppa codes is still unbroken and has been recommended by the PQCrypto project for long-term protection against attacks by a quantum computer [1] . However, the key sizes are rather large compared to classical public-key cryptosystems which has motivated a large amount of research on different code classes for the McEliece system. Many variants based on different code classes, e.g., Reed-Solomon codes were broken [26] . Unbroken variants with smaller key sizes than when using Goppa codes include variants of the McEliece cryptosystem (or its dual variant, the Niederreiter scheme [16] ) based on MDPC codes [15] ; and some systems based on rank-metric codes: e.g., [11] (originally called the Gabidulin-Paramanov-Tretjakov (GPT) system [9] ), the repair of [8] which was shown in [27] , low-rank-parity-check codes [10] ; and systems based on twisted codes [4] , [19] .
The original proposal of the McEliece system [13] using Goppa codes is considered to be secure against structural attacks. Encryption and decryption are very efficient due to efficient encoding/decoding methods of Goppa codes. However, in practice the system has the severe drawback of very large key sizes (e.g., several hundred KByte for 128 bits security level). The main goal of this paper is therefore to reduce the key size of the Goppa code-based McEliece system while not changing the structure of the code. The latter is important as Goppa codes are the only class of codes that has remained resilient against structural attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem for long time. Our significant key size reduction is achieved by using so-called interleaved codes, cf. [5] - [7] , [23] , i.e., using several parallel codewords of the same code, in combination with burst errors. This paper is structured as follows. Section II gives preliminaries on Goppa codes and the McEliece system and introduces notation. In Section III, the new system based on interleaved codes is defined and in Section IV, possible attacks are shown. This analysis includes an attack that breaks the system if the interleaving order is too large. The key sizes and security levels of our system are compared to known systems in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper and gives an outlook.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Goppa Codes and Reed-Solomon Codes
Let p be a prime power and let q = p m for some m > 1. Let F p and F q denote the finite fields of order p and q, respectively, and let F q [x] denote the polynomial ring over F q .
We index vectors and matrices starting from one, e.g., a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ F n q denotes a vector of length n with coefficients in F q . By the triple [n, k, d] p , we denote a p-ary code of length n, dimension k, and minimum Hamming distance d.
Let L = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) ∈ F n q consist of n non-zero distinct elements (code locators) of F q with n ≤ q. Let g(x) ∈ F q [x] be an irreducible monic polynomial of degree r such that g(α i ) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n (sometimes called the Goppa polynomial). For any word e = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ) ∈ F n p , the corresponding Goppa syndrome polynomial
.
) with support L is the kernel of the syndrome function over F p , i.e., the set:
The Goppa code Γ(L, g) is an [n, k ≥ n − mr, d ≥ r + 1] p code (cf. [12, Ch. 12] ). For binary Goppa codes, it can be shown that their minimum distance is at least 2r + 1. Binary Goppa codes can be decoded up to r errors uniquely by using Patterson's algorithm [17] . For non-binary Goppa codes, only r 2 errors can be guaranteed to be decoded uniquely, but the algorithm from [3] can decode up to 2r p errors with high probability which improves upon Patterson's algorithm only for p = 3. Note that the results of this paper extend straight-forward to square-free Goppa codes (i.e., g(x) has no multiple roots), but for simplicity, we restrict the description to irreducible Goppa codes.
The Goppa code Γ(L, g) is a p-ary subfield subcode of a generalized Reed-Solomon (RS) RS(n, k RS = n − r) code over F q of length n, dimension k RS and minimum distance r + 1 which is defined by:
where α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q are distinct elements and
, for all i = 1, . . . , n, cf. [22, p. 182 ].
B. Interleaved Goppa and Reed-Solomon Codes
In this paper, code interleaving refers to using s parallel codewords of the same code. An interleaved Goppa code is therefore defined as follows. (2) . . .
Further, an interleaved (generalized) Reed-Solomon (IRS) code can be defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Interleaved Reed-Solomon Code) For n distinct elements α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ∈ F q and n non-zero elements ν 1 , ν 2 , . . . , ν n ∈ F q , an Interleaved Reed-Solomon code IRS(n, k RS , s) of interleaving order s is given by
Notice that in general, the definition of IRS codes can be more general, i.e., having s parallel codewords from s RS codes with different dimensions and different column multipliers ν i . However, in this paper we focus on so-called homogeneous IRS codes, i.e., the s rows are codewords from the same RS code.
Interleaved codes are frequently considered in connection with burst errors, i.e., the s elementary codewords of the s-interleaved code are affected by s elementary error words e (1) , e (2) , . . . , e (s) of weight wt(e (i) ) = t i ≤ t where the union of the s sets of error positions
Equivalently, E denotes the t non-zero columns of E where
e (2) . . .
By solving a joint key equation (cf. [23] ), for an IRS(n, k RS , s) code,
burst errors (i.e., erroneous columns of E) can be corrected uniquely with high probability, cf.
[5]- [7] , [23] .
Compared to unique decoding, this can increase the decoding radius by a factor of almost two. Note that there are decoders that achieve an even higher decoding radius for small s (and mostly for low-rate IRS codes), e.g., [20] , [28] , but in this paper, we focus on decoding up to t IRS errors. As we will see in Section III-B, if we choose s ≥ t IRS , we can guarantee decryption/decoding, but such a system is not secure (Section IV). In particular, for s = n − k RS − 1, we obtain the maximum possible decoding radius of all IRS decoders (also [20] , [28] ), which is
If we interleave the RS(n, n − r) code which is a supercode (see (2)) of a given Γ(L, g) code with parameters
and for s = r−1, we obtain t IRS = s = r−1. Since the IΓ(L, g, s) code is a subfield subcode of the IRS(n, n−r, s) code, also the s-interleaved Goppa code can be decoded up to t IRS = s = r − 1 errors. The concept of interleaving is also illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
C. The McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem [13] and its dual variant, the Niederreiter cryptosystem [16] , provide general principles for code-based cryptography based on linear codes. The basic idea of the McEliece cryptosystem is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The private key consists of three matrices S, G, P where G is the generator matrix of a t-error correcting code. The private key is known only to the intended receiver ("Alice"). The public key is the product G pub = S·G·P and t. Encryption (by "Bob") is done by calculating from a plaintext m the ciphertext c = m · G pub + e, where e is a random vector of weight t. The receiver ("Alice") can recover the plaintext because she knows the private key. An eavesdropper ("Eve") should not be able to recover the matrix G and thus has to decode an unknown code. 
III. THE NEW PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON INTERLEAVED GOPPA CODES
A. The System
Our proposed cryptosystem is an instantiation of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem using an s-interleaved non-binary Goppa code IΓ(L, g, s) with parameters [n, k ≥ n − mr, d ≥ r + 1] p and p > 2.
This means that we encode s messages of length k into s Goppa codewords of length n and add a burst error of weight t IRS (see (4) ) to these interleaved codewords. Of course, we can see this as encrypting one message of length sk into one ciphertext of length sn. The decoding process that is needed for the decryption is then done in the IRS supercode IRS(n, n − r, s) which can correct a burst error of weight t IRS . f First, the key generation process is shown in the following. It is basically as for the McEliece cryptosystem based on Goppa codes, with the difference that an efficient decoder up to t IRS errors of the interleaved Goppa code is now part of the private key.
Key Generation:
• Choose parameters:
of degree r such that g(α i ) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n; -Integer s and calculate t IRS = sr s+1 ;
• Generate the following matrices:
-S ∈ F k×k p : random non-singular matrix, called scrambler matrix;
: random permutation matrix.
• Compute G pub = SGP ∈ F k×n p .
• Define the key pair:
-Public key: (G pub , t IRS , s); -Private key: (S, P, D) where D is an efficient decoding algorithm for the s-interleaved Goppa code up to t IRS errors.
Notice that we use p > 2 since for p = 2, the IRS supercode decoder cannot decode more errors than the standard Patterson decoder [17] which can correct up to r errors uniquely for binary Goppa codes.
The encryption process works similar as in the McEliece cryptosystem, with the difference that we are now creating s codewords of a Goppa code which are corrupted by a burst error of weight t IRS .
Encryption:
• Input: s plaintexts m (i) ∈ F k p , i = 1, . . . , s; • Generate full-rank random matrix E tIRS ∈ F s×tIRS p without zero elements; • Generate t IRS random positions E ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and denote by e (i) ∈ F n p the vector that contains the entries of the i-th row of E tIRS on the t IRS positions of E (ordered as in E tIRS ), for all i = 1, . . . , s;
The reason to choose only non-zero elements for E is that having rows of smaller weight in E would facilitate an information set decoding attack on these rows and therefore decrease the overall security level (see also Section IV).
Further, E tIRS is chosen to be a full-rank matrix as this decreases the failure probability of decoding/decryption significantly.
Decryption:
B. Decryption Guarantee
The system from the previous section is shown as a general system, using any integer s as interleaving order. In the following, we will show that if we choose s = r − 1 (which implies t IRS = r − 1), we can guarantee correct decryption (i.e., no decryption failures occur). However, in Section IV, we show that for s ≥ t IRS , our system can be broken by the decoding algorithm from [14] . Since we believe that failure-free decoding/decryption is interesting for the reader anyway, we show the details in the following.
As decoder in the decryption process, we can use any decoder of [5] - [7] , [23] which work for any s. In general, these decoders decode only with high probability. When choosing s ≥ t IRS , then, due to [14, Thm. 2] , there is a unique decoding result and any interleaved decoder (e.g., the one from [23] ) guarantees to return the unique decoding result. In particular, if we want to have this guarantee and therefore no decryption failures, we can choose s = t IRS = r − 1.
Theorem 1 (Decoding/Decryption Guarantee) Consider an s-interleaved non-binary Goppa code IΓ (L, g, s) where each row is from a Γ(L, g) code with parameters [n, k ≥ n−mr, d ≥ r +1] p and p > 2. Let s = t IRS = r −1.
For any s × t IRS full-rank error matrix E, the syndrome-based interleaved decoder from [23] can always correct up to t IRS = r − 1 errors uniquely.
Proof: The proof from [14, Thm. 2] can be applied to our setting as follows. We prove that the syndrome matrix used in the decoding process of [23] has full rank t IRS if s = t IRS .
Consider the following matrix:
where E is the s × n matrix from (3) which is determined by the s × t IRS full-rank matrix E tIRS and E in the encryption process; and H RS is a parity check matrix of the RS(n, n − r) supercode from (2). This can be rewritten by considering only the t IRS non-zero columns of E by
, where E tIRS contains the non-zero columns of E and H RS tIRS is the corresponding (n − k RS ) × t IRS submatrix of H RS . From [23, Eq. (17)], it follows that the IRS decoder always returns a unique decoding result (i.e., it does not fail) if S has rank t IRS . This is true in our case since E tIRS has full-rank t IRS and H RS tIRS as well since it is a submatrix of a parity-check matrix. Thus, the decoder from [23] will always correct up to t IRS = s errors.
Notice that in the decryption process of our cryptosystem, the decoder is applied to EP −1 which is a full rank matrix as both, E and P are full rank, and therefore Theorem 1 holds for EP −1 as well.
IV. POSSIBLE ATTACKS
A. Metzner-Kapturowski Decoding Attack
If s ≥ t IRS and E tIRS has full rank, then the algorithm from [14] decodes efficiently any interleaved code, just by applying Gaussian elimination on the product of the parity-check matrix and the corrupted codeword.
This principle can therefore be applied as follows to break our system if s ≥ t IRS and if E tIRS is a full-rank matrix:
• Calculate H pub from G pub such that H pub has full rank and G pub · H T pub = 0 (i.e., H pub is a parity-check matrix of the public code generated by G pub ); • Consider the s ciphertexts c (i) ∈ F n p , i = 1, . . . , s. They are codewords of the public code with generator matrix G pub and parity-check matrix H pub , corrupted by a full-rank burst error.
• Decode all c (i) with H pub according to the algorithm from [14] which then provides the s secret messages in cubic time. This general decoding principle therefore provides an attack to our system if s ≥ t IRS and if rk(E tIRS ) = t IRS . From a high-level point of view, decoding a "random" interleaved code is an easy problem for larger interleaving orders and if the burst errors has full rank.
Thus, for our parameter calculation in Section V, we have to choose s < t IRS . Also, since it might be possible to search the whole solution space of the decoder from [14] if s < t IRS , we should choose s "not too close" to
B. Information Set Decoding and Ball Collision Attack
In the classical information set decoding (ISD) attack, the attacker tries to guess an error-free information set. The work factor of ISD clearly increases with the number of errors added in the encryption process. Similar as it can be applied to the classical McEliece system based on Goppa codes, it can be applied to our interleaved system. However, as we are adding a burst error (i.e., s error vectors with non-zero elements at the same set of positions for each row) to the interleaved code, knowing an error-free information set of one ciphertext directly gives us error-free information sets of the other s − 1 ciphertexts. Thus, we assume that the work factor (i.e., the average complexity) of ISD for our s-interleaved system is the same as for the classical McEliece system with one ciphertext of length n where t IRS arbitrary errors were added.
For codes with p ≥ 3, the work factor of the classical ISD attacks and its variants is larger than for p = 2 as every operation needs to be carried out over F p . Therefore, to estimate the security level in bits (which is defined as the log 2 of the work factor), the work factor for p-ary ISD is calculated by log 2 (p) times the work factor for binary ISD for the same code parameters. This is just a lower bound and usually, the work factors for p-ary ISD can be much larger than for the binary case, see [18] .
As best-known variant of ISD, we use the ball collision attack to calculate the work factors and security levels. The work factor of the ball collision attack for binary Goppa codes with parameters [n, k, d] 2 (when an error of weight t is added) is:
C. Decoding-One-Out-of-Many Attack
The decoding-one-out-of-many attack [24] reduces the work factor W of any attack if the attackers has access to s ciphertexts and is interested in decoding only one of the messages. However, this attack provides a gain for the attacker on the work factor only if W ≤ s 3/2 . If this condition holds, e.g., the ISD work factor W ISD would be reduced to W 2/3 ISD . However, as we will see in the next section, this attack is not relevant for the parameters that we choose.
V. COMPARISON TO OTHER SYSTEMS AND CHOICE OF PARAMETERS
To compare the security levels and key sizes of our system to known systems, we first compare the following three variants of Goppa codes used in the McEliece system: A) s-Interleaved: This refers to our suggested system, see Section III-A, where s messages of length k are encrypted into s ciphertexts of length n by a Γ(L, g) Goppa code with parameters [n, k, d ≥ r + 1] p and a burst error of weight t IRS = sr s+1 is added. Table I and Table II use interleaving orders with s < t IRS and therefore the system has a small decryption failure probability. As explained in Section IV, the most efficient attack is the ball collision attack, which needs to be applied only to one ciphertext of length n. Thus, for a p-ary interleaved Goppa code, it has work factor (i.e., complexity) at least log 2 (p)W BC (n, k, t IRS ).
B) s-Independent:
In this setting, also s messages of length k are encrypted into s ciphertexts of length n by an [n, k, d ≥ r + 1] p Goppa code. However, the errors are added on each ciphertext independently. The maximum number of errors that can be added to be able to decode each ciphertext independently uniquely is t u = 2r p , see [3] . To obtain guaranteed decoding in this scheme (i.e., failure probability zero), t u = r 2 could be used. Notice that this decoding radius of [3] is only achieved with a certain failure probability and only improves upon t u = r 2 for p = 3. The work factor of the ball collision attack for the s ciphertexts is therefore s times the work factor for one ciphertext with t u errors, i.e., s log 2 (p)W BC (n, k, t u ).
This scheme can basically be seen as the classical McEliece cryptosystem (with a slightly better decoder if t u = 2r p is used). C) Long Code: Here, the message is encrypted to a single ciphertext of length sn by using an [n * = sn, k * , d * ≥ r * + 1] p Goppa code which is constructed from a polynomial g * (x) of degree r * . Decryption is done by using the unique decoder from [3] up to t * u = 2r * p errors. Also here, decryption is only done with high probability. The parameters k * and d * are chosen in our comparison either such that the key size is the same as in the s-interleaved case or such that the security level is the same. The best known attack is the ball collision attack applied to the single ciphertext of length n * = sn, i.e., it has work factor log 2 (p)W BC (sn, k * , t * u ). Table I shows a comparison between the three systems A, B, C based on Goppa codes with (almost) equal key size where the key size in bits is K = log 2 (p)(n−k)k for Methods A and B, respectively K * = log 2 (p)(sn−k * )k * for Method C. The security level in bits is the log 2 of the previously mentioned work factors based on the ball collision attack. The dimension in the table is lower bounded by k ≥ n − rm.
For Method C, there are two possibilities to choose k * as K = K * results in a quadratic equation in k * , both resulting in the same security level but one of high code rate and one of low code rate. For Method A, in Table I the general definition of the cryptosystem with small values for s is used and therefore, the IRS decoder has a small failure probability (cf. [23] ). However, as both, Method B and C are based on the decoding algorithm from [3] , they also have a decryption failure probability (which, according to our simulations, seems to be much larger than the one for Method A based on [23] ).
We can see that for s = 3, 7, our proposed s-interleaved cryptosystem (Method A) provides the largest security level. The case s = 2 and p = 3 is quite special as the decoding radius t coincides for methods A and B (and therefore adding burst errors actually does not make sense). However, in the interleaved case an attacker needs to decode only one out of the two ciphertexts and therefore the security level is lower than for Method B.
In general, Method A reaches a significantly larger security level for the same key size and therefore in the next table, only Method A is compared to the classical McEliece system using list decoding. In Table II , we compare our scheme with using a binary Goppa code and list decoding as presented in [2] which is the most efficient instantiation of the McEliece system based on standard (i.e., square-free or irreducible) Goppa codes. Compared to the McEliece system based on unique decoding, list decoding as in [2] reduces the key size by at most 5% for the same security level. As we have seen in Table I , our s-interleaved scheme reduces the key size significantly compared to the s-independent (Method B) scheme and the long code (Method C). Those two methods and unique decoding of Goppa codes (i.e., the "classical" McEliece scheme) are therefore not listed in Table II .
Note that our decryption algorithm (Method A) has a small failure probability. As previously mentioned, Methods B and C have a non-negligible failure probability as well since they are based on the decoding algorithm from [3] . According to our simulations, the failure probability of interleaved decoding seems to be much smaller than the one from [3] . The list decoding method from [2] might return a list of possible codewords which can be seen similar to a failure probability. Note that their list might be reducible to one codeword by using a CCA2-secure variant, see [2] , but this requires additional effort (rate reduction) and is not considered here.
The decoding-one-out-of-many attack mentioned in Section IV-C does not play a role in both tables as the work factor for all methods is always larger than s 3/2 .
Note that there are other schemes, e.g., quasi-cyclic moderate-density-parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes as in [15] , where our key size is larger for the same security level. However, as QC-MDPC codes have not resisted structural attacks for 40 years as Goppa codes, we believe it is fair to mainly compare our results to [2] .
Our Method A reduces the key size significantly compared to using list decoding in the classical McEliece system. In particular, for security level 128 bit, the bottom-most instantiation is remarkable as the code rate and security level are the same as in [2] , the total ciphertext length sn = 2662 is smaller than the one of [2] (3262), and the key size is reduced by 42%. Similary, for security level 256 bit, the bottom-most row shows almost the same code rate, same security level, sn = 8788 is only slightly larger than n = 7008, but the key size is reduced by 59%. Even larger reductions of the key size are possible when we allow sn of Method A to be larger than n of [2] , e.g., for security level 128 bit, the third instantiation of our method reduces the key size compared to [2] by 64%. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have presented a public-key code-based cryptosystem based on interleaved Goppa codes. Compared to the classical McEliece system using list decoding, our scheme can reduce the key size by over 50% for the same security level while keeping the code structure which has remained resilient against structural attacks for many years.
The following tasks are left for future work:
• Explicit analysis of the failure probability of our approach. This includes the derivation of an explicit upper bound as in [23] for decoding interleaved subfield subcodes (e.g., Goppa codes) as well the simulation of the failure probability for the parameters suggested in Tables I and II; • Can the decoding algorithm from [14] be used to obtain an efficient attack by searching the solution space?
Straight-forward, the complexity is too large to reduce the security level (see Section IV-A); • Interleaved decoding of Goppa codes not only to the interleaved decoding radius of the IRS code, but to a larger radius.
